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The year 2003 marks several notable anniversaries. Of most immediate 
significance, it is the bicentennial of Ohio statehood. But it is also the bicentennial of 
Marbury v. Madison,2 the case that is commonly but inaccurately said to have 
established the United States Supreme Court’s power of judicial review.3  Moreover, 
it is the centennial of W.E.B. Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk, which emphasized 
the centrality of race to American life.4  These three anniversaries come together in 
an important way. Long before the United States adopted the Fourteenth Amendment 
                                                                
1Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University.  Thanks to 
Dean Steven Steinglass and Professor Kevin O’Neill for inviting me to take part in this 
symposium, to participants in a faculty workshop at Case Law School for suggestions on an 
earlier version of this paper, and to Yvonne Wai for helpful research assistance.  
25 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). I have a particular interest in this subject.  One of my 
colleagues has accused me of spending ten weeks on this case in my Constitutional Law 
course.  See Erik M. Jensen, The Continuing Vitality of Tribal Sovereignty Under the 
Constitution, 60 MONT. L. REV. 3, 11 n.39 (1999).  This charge is wildly inaccurate, 
simultaneously both a gross exaggeration and a serious understatement.  I have never devoted 
more than five hours to Marbury before moving on to the next case.  At the same time, the 
issues raised by Marbury pervade the course. In that sense, everything is about Marbury.  
3The Court’s power to invalidate acts of Congress as inconsistent with the Constitution 
was widely assumed before Marbury. See, e.g., United States v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 
172 (1796) (Chase, J.) (stating the question presented as “whether the law of Congress [at 
issue] is unconstitutional and void”); THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).  See also United 
States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 52-53 (1852) (note appended by Taney, C.J., 
discussing the unreported 1794 case of United States v. Yale Todd, in which the Court held 
that Congress could not impose nonjudicial duties on judges). 
4There are, of course, other significant anniversaries this year.  Among them: the 
bicentennial of the Louisiana Purchase, see generally JON KUKLA, A WILDERNESS SO 
IMMENSE: THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (2003); the centennial of 
the Wright brothers’ first flight, see PETER L. JAKAB, VISIONS OF A FLYING MACHINE: THE 
WRIGHT BROTHERS AND THE PROCESS OF INVENTION (1990); and the sixty-fifth anniversary of 
the NAACP’s first Supreme Court case challenging segregated education, see Missouri ex rel. 
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).  
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with its guarantee of equal protection in 1868,5 the Ohio Constitution contained a 
guarantee of equality that drew on the natural rights principles embodied in the 
Declaration of Independence. The Buckeye State’s original constitution, adopted in 
1802, declared that “all men are born equally free.”6  The current version of the Ohio 
Bill of Rights, adopted in 1851, provides for the people’s “equal protection and 
benefit.”7  During the Nineteenth Century, the Ohio Supreme Court dealt with many 
cases involving racial issues. In the process, the court developed a jurisprudence that, 
although jarring to modern sensibilities, was in some respects surprisingly 
progressive for its time.  The court consistently rejected the so-called one-drop rule 
and afforded unusual protection to many persons of mixed race.8  Even when 
upholding racist laws, the court’s reasoning was considerably less offensive than that 
of the U.S. Supreme Court in cases raising similar issues.  By the end of the century, 
however, the Ohio Supreme Court had largely abandoned the quest for a distinctive 
jurisprudence of equality, deferring instead to the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The rise and decline of Buckeye equality doctrine is not merely a matter of 
historical interest.  Understanding this story can also shed light on contemporary 
constitutional jurisprudence. Until the past decade or so, the Ohio Supreme Court 
hesitated to develop distinctive interpretations of the state’s Bill of Rights despite the 
                                                                
5U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).  
6OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 1.  The full provision read: 
That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent 
and unalienable rights; amongst which are the [sic] enjoying and defending life and 
liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining 
happiness and safety; and every free republican government, being founded on their 
sole authority, and organized for the great purpose of protecting their rights and 
liberties, and securing their independence: to effect these ends they have at all times a 
complete power to alter, reform or abolish their government, whenever they may deem 
it necessary. 
The Declaration of Independence identified “certain unalienable rights,” including “life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” and emphasized “the right of the people to alter or 
abolish” the government in appropriate circumstances.  See generally CARL BECKER, THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS (1922); 
PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1997).  
7OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2.  This provision also echoed themes in the Declaration of 
Independence. It reads in full: 
All political power is inherent in the people.  Government is instituted for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter, reform, or abolish the same, 
whenever they may deem it necessary; and no special privileges or immunities shall 
ever be granted, that may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the general assembly.  
8This history is apparently unknown or has been forgotten.  A recent study of the Shaker 
Heights public schools reports a seemingly widespread belief that Ohio did follow the one-
drop rule.  See JOHN U. OGBU, BLACK AMERICAN STUDENTS IN AN AFFLUENT SUBURB 176 
(2003). Of course, the court’s rejection of this rule did not prevent some whites from adhering 
to it.  Also, as we shall see, some lower courts and an occasional justice did endorse the rule, 
but the Ohio Supreme Court as an institution never did so.  
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss3/6
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emergence of what has been called the New Judicial Federalism.9  Even now, the 
court’s approach has been halting and inconsistent at best.10  Accordingly, this paper 
will suggest some parallels between the older racial equality cases and the recent 
effort to define the extent to which individual rights receive independent protection 
under the Ohio Constitution. Part I examines the Ohio Supreme Court’s cases 
defining “white” in the contexts of legal disabilities and voting. Part II addresses the 
problem of segregation, especially in public schools. Part III focuses on the court’s 
retreat from independent interpretation of the state constitution’s equality guarantee 
and its general hesitancy to develop a distinctive approach to the Ohio Bill of Rights 
even in recent years.11 
                                                                
9Chief Justice Abrahamson, the keynote speaker at this conference, has been a leading 
figure in this movement.  See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson & Elizabeth A. Hartman, Building 
a More Perfect Union: Wisconsin’s Contribution to Constitutional Jurisprudence, 1998 WIS. 
L. REV. 677; Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence 
of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141 (1985); Shirley S. Abrahamson, 
Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 SW. L.J. 951 (1982). 
10See Richard A. Saphire, Ohio Constitutional Interpretation, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 437 
(2003); Marianna Brown Bettman, Ohio Joins the New Judicial Federalism Movement:  A 
Little To-ing and a Little Fro-ing, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. _491 (2003). 
11Before the Civil War the Ohio Supreme Court also dealt with slavery in a number of 
cases.  Comprehensive attention to the court’s slavery jurisprudence is beyond the scope of 
this article.  Nevertheless, a few cases deserve brief mention here. 
The Ohio Supreme Court took antislavery positions in Tom v. Daily, 4 Ohio 368 (1831), 
which held that a black boy born in Kentucky and sent to Cincinnati was free because the man 
who had purchased his slave mother had done so for the stated purpose of setting her free and 
could not thereafter claim that she was still a slave; in Birney v. State, 8 Ohio 230 (1837), 
which held that a defendant could not be convicted of harboring a fugitive slave without proof 
of knowledge that the person harbored was in fact a slave; and in Anderson v. Poindexter, 6 
Ohio St. 622 (1857), which rejected the concept of sojourning and held that a Kentucky slave 
brought into Ohio by his owner had become free by virtue of the owner’s voluntary entry into 
the Buckeye State. Birney was the last installment of a highly publicized controversy that 
helped to establish Salmon P. Chase as a leading opponent of slavery. Chase unsuccessfully 
represented the alleged fugitive slave Matilda, who lost at trial and was immediately hustled 
out of the courtroom by slave hunters before an appeal could be filed, and successfully 
appealed the conviction of abolitionist James G. Birney, who had been charged with harboring 
her.  See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 164-
65, 172 (1975); 2 CHARLES B. GALBREATH, HISTORY OF OHIO 203-04 (1925).  On the 
importance of the Anderson decision, which was handed down barely two months after Scott 
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT 
CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 444, 692 n.89 (1978). 
The Ohio Supreme Court also issued some proslavery rulings.  Among them were 
Richardson v. Beebee, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 197 (1846), which followed Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), and invalidated an Ohio law forbidding the 
removal of any “black or mulatto person” from the state without first proving to a judicial 
officer that the removed person was in fact a fugitive slave; and Ex parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 
77 (1859), which refused to issue writs of habeas corpus to Oberlin residents who had been 
convicted in federal court of forcibly rescuing a fugitive slave.  Richardson was issued by two 
justices on circuit, not by the full court.  Bushnell was a 3-2 ruling that provoked a 97-page 
dissenting opinion by Justice Sutliff, who has been described as “a pronounced Abolitionist.” 
1 A HISTORY OF THE COURTS AND LAWYERS OF OHIO 250 (Carrington T. Marshall ed., 1934). 
For further discussion of Bushnell and its relationship to Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
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I.  DEFINING “WHITE” 
Race was a pervasive issue in the events leading to Ohio statehood.  Two 
questions predominated: whether Ohio would be a slave state and whether blacks 
would enjoy civil rights.  The 1802 constitutional convention, which adopted the 
state’s first charter, had little difficulty in deciding that Ohio would forbid slavery, 
although the delegates debated extensively before endorsing two additional clauses 
that were designed to prohibit certain forms of indenture that might have been used 
to circumvent the ban on slavery.12  The civil rights question proved to be much 
more problematic.  After extensive debate, the convention by a one-vote margin 
adopted a voting rights provision that limited the franchise to white males while 
rejecting, by a similar margin, a more extreme proposal that would have precluded 
African Americans from holding office or testifying in court against a white person.13  
The racial restriction on suffrage would be continued in the 1851 constitution and 
remain on the books until 1923.14  Although the other restrictions were kept out of 
                                                          
506 (1859), which dealt with a similar controversy that arose in Wisconsin, see COVER, supra, 
at 188-89, 253-54.  
12The antislavery provision read as follows: 
There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in this state, otherwise than for 
the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted; nor shall 
any male person, arrived at the age of twenty-one years, or female person arrived at 
the age of eighteen years, be held to serve any person as a servant, under the pretense 
of indenture or otherwise, unless such person shall enter into such indenture while in a 
state of perfect freedom, and on condition of a bona fide consideration received, or to 
be received, for their service, except as before excepted.  Nor shall any indenture of 
any negro [sic] or mulatto, hereafter made and executed out of state, or if made in the 
state, where the term of service exceeds one year, be of the least validity, except those 
given in the case of apprenticeships. 
OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 2.  For further details about the adoption of this provision, 
see Helen M. Thurston, The 1802 Constitutional Convention and the Status of the Negro, 81 
OHIO HIST. 14, 15-21 (1972); Barbara A. Terzian, “Effusions of Folly and Fanaticism”: Race, 
Gender, and Constitution-Making in Ohio, 1802-1923, at 59-70, 93-102 (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Ohio State University, 1999).  
13See Thurston, supra note 12, at 21-26; Terzian, supra note 12, at 102-12.  
14See OHIO CONST. art. V, § 1 (amended 1923). For discussion of the retention of the racial 
restriction on voting, see Terzian, supra note 12, at 206-10. This restriction was rendered 
inoperative by the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, which allowed African 
Americans to vote in Ohio despite the whites-only provision in the state constitution. See 
DAVID A. GERBER, BLACK OHIO AND THE COLOR LINE, 1860-1915, at 40 (1976). The 1912 
constitutional convention, which was dominated by progressive forces, proposed an 
amendment to delete the word “white” from the suffrage provision, but the voters rejected that 
idea. See HOYT LANDON WARNER, PROGRESSIVISM IN OHIO, 1897-1917, at 325, 342 (1964); 
Robert E. Cushman, Voting Organic Laws, 28 POL. SCI. Q. 207, 227-28 (1913); Lloyd Luther 
Sponholtz, Progressivism in Microcosm: An Analysis of the Political Forces at Work in the 
Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1912, at 244, 246 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Pittsburgh, 1969).  Several sources note without explanation that the racial 
limitation was finally removed in 1923, but no good historical study of this belated 
amendment seems to exist.  See, e.g., 2 GALBREATH, supra note 11, at 115; GEORGE W. 
KNEPPER, OHIO AND ITS PEOPLE 335 (2d ed. 1997).  One scholar notes in passing that the 
enfranchisement of women might have affected the decision.  See Terzian, supra note 12, at 
279.  
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss3/6
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the constitution, the legislature soon passed laws imposing various legal disabilities 
on blacks.  Consequently, the Ohio Supreme Court had many occasions to address 
racial issues.  The court first had to determine who was white under racial legislation 
that restricted persons of color from appearing as witnesses.  The rules developed in 
this area served as precedents for interpreting the whites-only rule for voting. 
A.  Statutory Disabilities and the Definition of “White” 
Although the 1802 constitutional convention rejected proposals to impose 
additional limitations on persons of color other than the ban on voting, the legislature 
quickly enacted statutory disabilities.  In early January 1804, the second session of 
the General Assembly passed a law requiring all “black or mulatto” persons 
intending to live in the state to produce a certificate of freedom.15  Three years later, 
the legislature stiffened the rules.  Now any “negro or mulatto” immigrant would 
have to arrange for a $500 bond “with two or more freehold sureties” in order to 
assure the immigrant’s “good behavior.”16  Perhaps these provisions reflected a 
genuine economic concern that slave owners in the adjoining states of Virginia and 
Kentucky might force their aging or infirm slaves to emigrate to Ohio.17  That is 
certainly not the whole story.  Another provision of the 1807 law makes clear that 
racism was a substantial factor in the adoption of these measures.  That provision 
prohibited any “black or mulatto person” from “be[ing] sworn or giv[ing] evidence” 
in any legal proceeding in which a white person was a party or in which the state was 
prosecuting a white person.18  
The Ohio Supreme Court never addressed the constitutionality of this law, but its 
decisions make clear the judicial distaste for racial restrictions.  The leading case on 
the meaning of the racial restriction on testimony is Gray v. State,19 in which the 
defendant was one-quarter black and three-quarters white.  Polly Gray was charged 
with robbery; she invoked the statutory bar when the prosecutor called a black man 
as a witness against her.  The trial judge, observing that Gray was “of a shade of 
color between the mulatto and white,” concluded that she was not entitled to prevent 
                                                                
15Act of Jan. 5, 1804, ch. IV, § 1, 2 Ohio Laws 63, 63.  This measure also required blacks 
and mulattoes to register with the county clerk, who would on payment of a fee of twelve and 
a half cents issue a certificate of freedom.  Failure to obtain a proper certificate, either from 
the county clerk or a court of competent jurisdiction, would prevent blacks and mulattoes from 
obtaining employment.  Persons who employed blacks and mulattoes who lacked a certificate 
were subject to fines.  See id. §§ 2, 3, 5.  
16Act of Jan. 25, 1807, ch. VIII, § 1, 5 Ohio Laws 53, 53.  
17See Terzian, supra note 12, at 117.  This concern was made explicit in an 1831 statute, 
which emphasized that the measure would not “enable any black or mulatto person to gain a 
legal settlement in this state.”  An Act for the Relief of the Poor, § 2, 29 Ohio Laws 320, 321 
(1831).  
18Act of Jan. 25, 1807, ch. VIII, § 4, 5 Ohio Laws 53, 54.  The legislature enacted 
additional restrictions over the next quarter-century.  See GERBER, supra note 14, at 4; see 
generally STEPHEN MIDDLETON, THE BLACK LAWS IN THE OLD NORTHWEST: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 13-18, 47-48 (1993).  Most of these measures were repealed in 1849 after more than 
a decade of political struggle.  See generally Leonard Erickson, Politics and Repeal of Ohio’s 
Black Laws, 1837-1849, 82 OHIO HIST. 154 (1973).  
194 Ohio 353 (1831).  
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
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the black witness from testifying.20  The supreme court reversed in a terse ruling.  
The law was “one which a court is called upon to execute with reluctance,”21 and the 
justices were “unwilling to extend the disabilities of the statute further than its letter 
requires.”22  Accordingly, the statutory terms “white, black, and mulatto” should be 
strictly construed: “Color alone is insufficient.”23  The proper test was one of blood: 
“[A] man [sic], of a race nearer white than a mulatto, . . . should partake in the 
privileges of whites.”24  In short, any person who was less than half black was legally 
white, regardless of skin tone. 
This definition of white is strikingly more inclusive than the approach taken in 
other states, not only during the Nineteenth Century but also well into the Twentieth.  
Typically, a fraction of African ancestry as small as one-eighth or one-sixteenth was 
sufficient to render a person legally black elsewhere in the country.25  For at least 
some purposes, several states followed the notorious one-drop rule, under which the 
slightest amount of African ancestry disqualified an individual from having the legal 
status of white.26  At the same time, there is a profound irony to the Gray decision.  
By expansively defining “white,” the court protected a visibly mixed-race defendant 
against the potentially damaging testimony of a full-blooded black witness. 
Nevertheless, the approach in Gray reflected the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
discomfort with the race-based witness-disqualification statute.  The court reiterated 
its distaste for the law fifteen years later, in the civil case of Jordan v. Smith,27 noting 
both its unsavory implications for the interests of blacks and its potential for 
promoting injustice by excluding potentially crucial evidence.  The dispute involved 
                                                                
20Id. at 353 (emphasis omitted).  
21Id. at 354.  
22Id.  
23Id.  
24Id. (emphasis added).  
25See generally PAULI MURRAY, STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR (1950); GILBERT 
THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 14-17 (1910).  
26See MURRAY, supra note 25, at 22 (Alabama), 39-40 (Arkansas), 90 (Georgia), 173-74 
(Louisiana), 356 (Oklahoma), 428 (Tennessee), 443-44 (Texas), 462 (Virginia).  Virginia’s 
laws defining race have an especially fascinating history, at one time embodying both the one-
drop rule for defining African Americans and a Pocahontas exception for descendants of John 
Rolfe and the Indian princess.  See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial 
Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967, 
1975-81 (1989); Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia’s Anti-Miscegenation Statute 
in Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1191-1204 (1966).  The state’s law against 
interracial marriage was invalidated in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  The last 
installment in the battle over Louisiana’s racial classification laws was fought within the past 
two decades.  See Doe v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Health and Human Resources, Office of Vital 
Statistics, 479 So. 2d 369 (La. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 485 So. 2d 60 (La.), appeal 
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 479 U.S. 1002 (1986); see generally 
Raymond T. Diamond & Robert J. Cottrol, Codifying Caste: Louisiana’s Racial Classification 
Scheme and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 LOY. L. REV. 255 (1983); Calvin Trillin, American 
Chronicles: Black or White, NEW YORKER, Apr. 14, 1986, at 62.  
2714 Ohio 199 (1846).  
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss3/6
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a white man’s attempt to collect a debt from a black woman.  The defendant denied 
having executed the note, whereupon the plaintiff sought to rebut that denial with the 
deposition of another black woman who claimed to have signed the note as a 
witness.  He argued that the second woman would not be serving as a witness in the 
case but merely verifying the allegations of the complaint.28  The court rejected this 
argument, reasoning that the logic of the plaintiff’s position would “more completely 
put the black man in the power of the white” by allowing whites to take advantage of 
blacks with impunity unless there happened to be a white witness to the events.29  By 
effectively preventing an African American from “swear[ing] to the truth of his plea, 
. . . you call in the courts of justice in carrying out a system of oppression.”30  
Therefore, the plaintiff had to prove the execution of the note.  Although there was 
no doubt that he had a good claim, he could prove his case only through the 
testimony of the second woman and the statute prevented her from testifying.31  
Because there was no evidence to support the complaint’s allegations, the case had to 
be dismissed even though the effect of the statute was “to prevent justice.”32 
The Jordan opinion suggests that the court might have been receptive to a more 
direct attack on the statute, but the white plaintiff sought to evade rather than attack 
its exclusion.  On the other hand, when confronted with a constitutional challenge to 
the law two years later, the court avoided the issue.  Woodson v. State ex rel. 
Borland33 was an action against the surety of an estate administrator who allegedly 
had failed to collect debts that were owed to the estate.  The defendant surety sought 
to call the debtors, who were mulattoes, as witnesses, but the trial court refused to 
allow them to testify.34  On appeal, the surety argued that the disqualification law did 
not apply in this case because none of the parties was white but that, if the statute did 
somehow apply, it was unconstitutional.35  Without reaching that question, the court 
held that the action could not proceed because there had been no proper demand for 
payment.36 
In short, the Ohio Supreme Court took pains to construe the witness-
disqualification law as narrowly as possible.  Of particular significance, the 
expansive definition of white would have wider implications for interpreting the 
race-based qualification for voting. 
B.  “White” Voting 
The constitutional limitation of voting rights to white males generated a 
substantial body of litigation.  The Ohio Supreme Court consistently adhered to its 
                                                                
28Id. at 200. 
29Id. at 202.  
30Id. 
31Id. at 204. 
32Id. 
3317 Ohio 161 (1848). 
34Id. at 163. 
35Id. at 166-67. 
36Id. at 169. 
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expansive definition of “white” despite several attempts by the legislature to impose 
stricter tests for voter eligibility. In all of these cases, the court relied on its reasoning 
in Gray. 
Voting cases first reached the court in 1842.  In Jeffries v. Ankeny,37 the court 
held that a man who was one-quarter Indian and three-quarters white was a lawful 
voter.  Chief Justice Lane observed that “many persons of the precise breed of this 
plaintiff,” including the current clerk of the Ohio Supreme Court, had “exercised 
political privileges . . . and worthily discharged the duties of officers.”38  Although 
Gray had involved the construction of a statute involving African Americans rather 
than the interpretation of a constitutional provision and the present case involved 
American Indians, the court found the reasoning of the earlier case persuasive.  If a 
person who was more white than black could be white, so could a person who was 
more white than Indian in ancestry.39  In Thacker v. Hawk,40 a case decided the same 
day, the court explicitly rejected the one-drop rule for voting.  A man who was partly 
black and partly white argued that he had been wrongly prevented from voting.  He 
invoked Gray, but the trial court instructed the jury to find against him “if the 
plaintiff have any negro [sic] blood whatever.”41  Chief Justice Lane dispatched the 
issue in a single sentence, saying only that the “charge was wrong, and judgment 
must be reversed.”42 
These rulings did not settle the issue for whites who agreed with the Thacker 
dissenter that “[t]he word ‘white’ means pure white, unmixed.”43  Following the 
adoption of the new state constitution in 1851 and shortly after the Dred Scott 
decision,44 the Ohio legislature passed a bill excluding mixed-race men from 
voting.45  Local officials relied on the new law to prevent a man who was one-eighth 
black and seven-eighths white from voting.  The Ohio Supreme Court found the 
statute unconstitutional in Anderson v. Millikin.46  The unanimous opinion began by 
citing Gray and the voting cases decided under the 1802 constitution, then noted that 
the convention that wrote the 1851 constitution had to know of the authoritative 
                                                                
3711 Ohio 372 (1842). 
38Id. at 375. 
39A dissenting opinion endorsed the one-drop rule, asserting that the racial restriction 
“excludes Indians and part Indians, and all persons not of the pure blood of the white race.”  
Id. at 375-76 (Read, J., dissenting). 
4011 Ohio 376 (1842). 
41Id. at 379. 
42Id. 
43Id. at 380 (Read, J., dissenting). 
44Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
45An Act to Prescribe the Duties of Judges of Elections in Certain Cases, and Preserve the 
Purity of Elections, 56 Ohio Laws 120 (1859); see Kenneth J. Winkle, Ohio’s Informal 
Polling Place, in THE PURSUIT OF PUBLIC POWER: POLITICAL CULTURE IN OHIO, 1787-1861, at 
169, 181-82 (Jeffrey P. Brown & Andrew R.L. Cayton eds., 1994). 
469 Ohio St. 568 (1859). 
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judicial construction of the whites-only voting provision.47  Moreover, there was 
actual evidence that the convention delegates were aware of this construction.48  
Accordingly, the meaning of “white” in the voting clause was the same under the 
new constitution as it was under the old one: men who were more white than black 
were legally white and therefore entitled to vote.49  Moreover, nothing in Dred Scott 
required a contrary conclusion.  Scott himself was said to be a pure-blooded African, 
so the case did not address the legal status of mixed-race persons.50  It was clear, 
however, that the framers of the Ohio Constitution intended “no reference to color” 
in referring to “citizens of the United States” in the suffrage section.51  Finally, 
although the legislature was entitled to disagree with the court’s interpretation of this 
crucial word, a mere statute could not alter the meaning of a constitution.  The 
framers of the new constitution were entitled to overturn the court’s interpretation of 
the prior document, but they had not done so.52 
Anderson did not settle the voting question.  That issue became caught up in the 
Reconstruction politics of Ohio.  In April 1868, the antiblack majority that gained 
control of the legislature in the 1867 elections passed another law forbidding anyone 
“having a distinct and visible admixture of African blood” from voting.53  In Monroe 
v. Collins,54 the court unanimously struck down this new law, reasoning that it was 
even more objectionable than the one invalidated in Anderson.55  The statute imposed 
“unreasonable burdens of proof” on otherwise qualified voters and improper limits 
on the “kind and amount of evidence” that they had to produce in order to exercise 
the franchise.56  In particular, “admixture of black blood may be proven by 
                                                                
47Id. at 569-70. 
48Id. at 571-72. 
49Id. at 572. 
50Id. at 572-73. 
51Id. at 577.  Indeed, if only whites could be citizens of the United States, the addition of 
the word “white” to the voting section would have been redundant.  Id. at 578. 
52Id. at 578-79. 
53Act of Apr. 16, 1868, § 1, 65 Ohio Laws 97, 97.  This measure also required election 
judges to propound a lengthy set of intrusive questions to challenged voters, who were also 
required to produce two credible witnesses to attest to their whiteness.  On the background to 
this measure, see FELICE A. BONADIO, NORTH OF RECONSTRUCTION: OHIO POLITICS, 1865-
1870, at 104-05 (1970); see generally id. at 79-109.  This was not the only mischief 
perpetrated by the new legislature.  It also purported to rescind the previous legislature’s 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and rejected the Fifteenth Amendment.  See 
GERBER, supra note 14, at 39.  The legislature tried to resolve any lingering ambiguity about 
Ohio’s position by belatedly ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment earlier this year.  See 
Stephen Ohlemacher, More Than 130 Years Later, Ohio OKs 14th Amendment: Equal-
Protection Issue Ratified After Long, Bitter Fight, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 13, 2003, at A1.  
It didn’t take that long for the Buckeye State definitively to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment. 
That happened in early 1870.  See GERBER, supra note 14, at 40. 
5417 Ohio St. 665 (1868). 
55Id. at 685. 
56Id. at 686. 
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reputation, appearance, or opinion, and by any number of witnesses that may ‘seem 
proper’ to the challengers, who may ask ‘any other questions’ that may ‘seem to 
them necessary,’ but white blood must be shown by direct and positive testimony, 
and in many, if not most cases, such testimony as can not be supposed to be within 
the power of the voter.”57  Because the statute would exclude many potential voters 
who were less than half black, it conflicted with the state constitution as that charter 
had been repeatedly and authoritatively construed.58 
These decisions demonstrate the Ohio Supreme Court’s commitment to limiting 
the impact of racial restrictions on suffrage.  By consistently holding that any person 
who could claim ancestry of more than half white was legally white, the court 
provided what by Nineteenth Century standards was unusually strong protection for 
persons of color.  To be sure, the court did not challenge the racist premise 
underlying the voting restriction.  Nonetheless, its rulings afforded rights to some 
visibly mixed-race individuals who were regarded as black.  Similar issues arose in 
the context of public education, and at least for a time the court took a similar 
approach to some persons of color in that setting.  The court would eventually reject 
constitutional attacks on segregated schools, but its reasoning was less offensive than 
it might have been. 
II.  SEGREGATED SCHOOLS 
To understand the background to the school cases, it is important to understand 
that African Americans were excluded from Ohio public schools for many years.  
The very first common school law, enacted in 1829, forbade “black and mulatto 
persons” from attending tax-supported schools.59  Not until 1848 did the legislature 
specifically authorize schools for nonwhite children.60  That law was repealed and 
replaced by a somewhat different measure the following year.61  Both statutes 
prohibited the imposition of taxes on white property owners to support colored 
schools, so as a practical matter few communities provided for the education of 
children who were not legally white.62  For many years, therefore, school litigation 
dealt with whether children who were not purely white could attend public schools. 
This question first arose in the 1834 case of Williams v. Directors of School 
District No. 6,63 a case decided by two justices on circuit rather than by the full Ohio 
                                                                
57Id. at 687. 
58Id. at 688-89. 
59An Act to Provide for the Support and Better Regulation of Common Schools, § 1, 37 
Ohio Laws 72, 73 (1829).  African Americans were not obliged to pay taxes to support the 
common schools. Id. 
60An Act to Provide for the Establishment of Common Schools for the Children of Black 
and Mulatto Persons, 46 Ohio Laws 81 (1848) [hereinafter 1848 Act].  There is some 
confusion about the children eligible to attend these schools.  The statute’s title referred to 
“black and mulatto persons,” but § 1 talked of “black or colored persons.”  Id. at 81. 
61An Act to Authorize the Establishment of Separate Schools for the Education of Colored 
Children, 47 Ohio Laws 17 (1849) [hereinafter 1849 Act].  This bill also repealed the 1804 
and 1807 disability laws, as well as some other black laws.  Id. § 6, 47 Ohio Laws at 18. 
62See 1848 Act § 9, 46 Ohio Laws at 83; 1849 Act § 3, 47 Ohio Laws at 17. 
63Wright 578 (Ohio 1834). 
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Supreme Court. At issue was whether the five children whose father was one-quarter 
black and whose mother was white could attend the public schools.64  Relying on 
Gray, the court reasoned that the school law focused on “blood and not 
complexion.”65  Any other interpretation “might operate to exclude many children not 
intended to be excluded by the Legislature” and in any event would reward the 
school district for its “shabby meanness” of requiring the father to pay taxes to 
support schools from which his children were barred.66 
The full court endorsed this definition of “white” in several cases over the next 
decade and a half.  The first of these cases was Chalmers v. Stewart,67 in which a 
teacher was not paid after allowing black children to attend his classes.  The court 
began by noting that it had just decided, in the voting context, that anyone whose 
ancestry was more than half white was deemed to be legally white.68  This 
determination did not resolve the case, however, because the evidence showed that 
some of the children Stewart had taught were not legally white, and the school law 
forbade black pupils from attending public schools.69  If this could be established, the 
teacher had violated his obligation “to keep a legal school” and therefore had no 
right to be paid.70  At this point the opinion took on a jarring and offensive tone: 
Justice Wood analogized the teacher’s acceptance of black students to “admit[ting] 
the vicious and corrupt [and] fill[ing] his school with prostitutes or thieves, or those 
openly profane or licentious.”71  Subsequent cases avoid such inflammatory 
language, however. 
The following year, in Lane v. Baker,72 the court held that Gray and Williams, as 
well as the voting cases, required a local school district to admit racially mixed 
children who were more than half white.  The jury found that the plaintiff’s son “was 
of negro [sic], Indian and white blood, but of more than half white blood,” which 
was sufficient to establish the boy’s entitlement to attend the public school.73 
Then in 1848, in Stewart v. Southard,74 the court returned to the issue addressed 
in Chalmers and dispensed with the inflammatory rhetoric.  This unanimous ruling 
rejected a white parent’s suit against the local school board for unlawfully allowing 
colored children to attend classes.75  The court first distinguished Lane, which 
involved the unlawful rejection of a legally eligible “white” student of mixed race 
                                                                
64Id. at 579. 
65Id. at 580. 
66Id. 
6711 Ohio 386 (1842). 
68Id. at 387 (citing Thacker v. Hawk, 11 Ohio 376 (1842)). 
69Id. at 387-88. 
70Id. at 387. 
71Id. at 388. 
7212 Ohio 237 (1843). 
73Id. at 242. 
7417 Ohio 402 (1848). 
75Id. at 402. 
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rather than the unlawful admission of legally ineligible students; the former was a 
complete denial of the right to an education, whereas the latter simply made school 
attendance “less desirable” than it might otherwise have been.76  The court went on 
to find two insurmountable obstacles to the parent’s lawsuit.  First, allowing the case 
to proceed would open the floodgates to claims by every parent in the district, an 
eventuality for which there was “[n]o necessity.”77  Second, there was no evidence 
about how the particular school was funded.  It was conceivable that the black 
parents had voluntarily put up the money for the school, in which case the law 
allowed their children to attend classes.  Accordingly, there was a fatal flaw in the 
record.78 
These rulings, like those in the voting cases, offered legal protection only to those 
mixed-race persons whose ancestry was more than half white.  On the other hand, 
the decisions provided limited benefits to some individuals who were commonly 
regarded as persons of color.  At a time when most African American children were 
barred from public schools, those limited benefits suggest the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
continuing ambivalence about racial discrimination.  It would be wrong to regard the 
court as a hotbed of abolitionist sentiment, of course, but that tribunal was surely 
more progressive than the U.S. Supreme Court during this period. 
The education cases discussed so far addressed only who was eligible to attend 
public schools.  Now we turn to cases involving segregation.  Those cases suggest 
that the Ohio Supreme Court was more tolerant of race-based laws when those laws 
at least in theory provided alternative options for African Americans than when those 
laws completely denied them rights or opportunities that were available to whites. 
The court first upheld segregated schools in State ex rel. Directors of the Eastern 
and Western School Districts v. City of Cincinnati,79 a case that arose under the 1849 
separate school law.  Under that statute, two separate colored school districts were 
established in Cincinnati, and city officials collected taxes from African American 
residents to support those districts.  Those officials refused, however, to disburse the 
funds to the school districts, at least in part on the theory that the 1849 law was 
unconstitutional because it allowed African Americans to serve as school district 
directors.80  The court rejected this argument.  It began by noting that the 1849 
school law had also repealed most of the statutory disabilities that previously had 
been imposed on black Ohioans, which would presumably have allowed the 
admission of African American children to the previously all-white Cincinnati public 
schools unless the city acted under other sections of this statute to create separate 
schools for colored youth.81  Nothing in the Ohio Constitution prevented the 
legislature from authorizing the creation of such districts.82  Finally, the court 
explained that invalidating the separate colored school districts would have the 
                                                                
76Id. at 404-05. 
77Id. at 406. 
78Id. 
7919 Ohio 178 (1850). 
80Id. at 196. 
81Id. at 191. 
82Id. at 197. 
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undesirable consequence of allowing African American children to attend the white 
schools.  “As a matter of policy,” said the court, “it is unquestionably better that the 
white and colored youth should be placed in separate schools.”83 
We can read this ruling in at least two ways.  First, and most obviously, it upheld 
segregated schools.  That fact is not especially unusual. Indeed, the year before this 
case was decided, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld segregated 
schools in Roberts v. City of Boston.84  Second, and more significant, unlike Roberts, 
in which segregation was challenged by African Americans who sought integrated 
public schools, the challengers in the Cincinnati case were local officials who had no 
interest in providing any education at all for black children.  Despite the Ohio 
Supreme Court’s obvious distaste for integration, its unanimous decision makes clear 
that the city could not prevent African Americans from attending school.  The 
validity of segregation was not really at issue in this case. 
That subject was strongly affected by the new school law of 1853, which 
repealed the 1849 statute and comprehensively restructured public education in 
Ohio.85  This new measure specifically authorized public schools for “colored 
children” but did not define that crucial term.86  In Van Camp v. Board of 
Education,87 the Ohio Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, for the first time departed 
from the rule that any person who is more than half white by blood is legally white.  
Local school officials in the Village of Logan, in Hocking County, refused to permit 
children who were five-eighths white and three-eighths black to attend the white 
public school.88  The majority opinion emphasized that the 1853 school law required 
school districts to create separate schools for African Americans and guaranteed 
those schools a proportionate share of all school taxes collected.89  Accordingly, the 
statute was “one of classification and not of exclusion,” so the traditional racial 
definitions did not necessarily apply.90  Whites over the previous two generations had 
developed a “natural repugnance” against close association with African Americans, 
whom the majority described in terms reminiscent of Dred Scott as “a proscribed and 
degraded race.”91  Moreover, it was “notorious” that the court’s rulings allowing 
                                                                
83Id. at 198. 
8459 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).  The U.S. Supreme Court would attach considerable 
significance to this ruling from the highest court in a jurisdiction where the interests of African 
Americans “ha[d] been longest and most earnestly enforced.”  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537, 544 (1896). 
85An Act to Provide for the Reorganization, Supervision and Maintenance of Common 
Schools, 51 Ohio Laws 429 (1853) [hereinafter 1853 Act]. 
86Id. § 31, 51 Ohio Laws at 441. 
879 Ohio St. 406 (1859). 
88Id. at 408. 
89Id. at 409.  The majority might have given this provision an excessively positive 
interpretation.  The obligation to provide separate schools for colored children arose only 
when there were more than 30 such children in the district.  See 1853 Act § 31, 51 Ohio Laws 
at 441. 
90Van Camp, 9 Ohio St. at 410. 
91Id. 
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visibly colored children to attend classes with white children “did not receive the 
hearty approval of the state at large.”92  Under these circumstances, the legislature’s 
references to race in the school law should be given their “ordinary and common 
acceptation.”93  The children at issue were “in fact, if not in law, colored.”94  Except 
for Gray, most of the earlier cases are only cursorily reasoned, and the decisions 
appeared to rest on the exclusionary nature of the restrictions; under the 1853 school 
law, by contrast, black and visibly mixed-race children were provided for.95  Only at 
this point did the majority concede that there was no colored school in Logan 
because of the small number of African American children (fewer than the statutory 
threshold of thirty).  Still, making “further and more definite provision” for the 
plaintiff’s children was “a matter for the consideration of the legislature, and not for 
the judiciary.”96  As a result, the children could not attend any public school at all. 
For them, the practical effect of this ruling was indeed exclusion rather than 
classification. 
The dissenters challenged every aspect of the court’s analysis.  They viewed the 
majority as having endorsed “caste legislation”97 and, in language that anticipated 
modern equal protection doctrine, warned against racial, religious, and similar 
classifications, which deserved “strict construction” against their validity.98  They 
concluded with an extensive review of prior cases, which established that the terms 
“white” and “colored” had precise legal definitions that differed from popular 
usage.99  Ironically, the full court used precisely this kind of analysis later the same 
term in Anderson, the unanimous decision striking down the legislature’s attempt to 
eliminate mixed-race voting.100  Meanwhile, Van Camp contributed to the 
legislature’s revision of the 1853 law in 1864.  That amendment lowered the 
threshold for establishing colored schools to twenty and authorized adjoining school 
districts with lower school-age African American populations to combine their 
resources to provide separate education for minority pupils.101  This development led 
                                                                
92Id. at 411 (noting “the repugnance felt by many of the white youths and their parents to 
mingling, socially and on equal terms, with those who had any perceptible admixture of 
African blood”).  The majority’s reasoning therefore cannot be construed as even implicitly 
endorsing the one-drop rule.  The court explained that “[t]he only question presented” in the 
case dealt with the legal status of “children of five-eighths white and three-eights African 
blood, who are distinctly colored and generally treated and regarded as colored children by 
the community where they reside.”  Id. at 408 (emphasis added).  Under the school law, the 
majority concluded that “colored” meant “[a] person who has any perceptible admixture of 
African blood.”  Id. at 411 (emphasis added). 
93Id. at 412. 
94Id. at 411. 
95Id. at 413. 
96Id. at 414. 
97Id. at 415 (Sutliff, J., dissenting). 
98Id. at 416. 
99Id.; see id. at 416-24 (reviewing decisions dating back to Gray). 
100See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text. 
101Act of Mar. 18, 1864, § 4, 61 Ohio Laws 31, 33. 
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to another important segregation ruling that the U.S. Supreme Court would cite in 
two of its most important cases on the subject. 
The direct legal challenge to segregated schools in Ohio came in the case of State 
ex rel. Garnes v. McCann.102  The case was tried on stipulated facts.  The only 
question was the constitutionality of separate schools; the parties agreed that the 
school for colored children “affords to such children all the advantages and 
privileges of a common school, equal to those of the school for white children.”103  A 
unanimous court rejected the constitutional challenge.  The opinion emphasized that 
the black children had not been denied an education equal to that afforded to whites; 
if that had been the situation, “more doubt would arise.”104  Prior cases had “firmly 
established” the government’s power under state law to classify and segregate 
schoolchildren.105  Turning to federal law, the court rejected arguments based on the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Although that 
provision had yet to receive authoritative construction from the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the Ohio Supreme Court anticipated the ruling in The Slaughter-House Cases106 that 
this provision offered limited protection against state regulations.  The court 
suggested that the clause “includes only such privileges or immunities as are derived 
from, or recognized by, the constitution of the United States.”107  Moreover, there 
was no equal protection violation because the segregation law did not “deprive 
colored persons of any rights”; that law guaranteed “equal common school 
advantages.”108  Echoing the reasoning of Van Camp, although perhaps with greater 
justification because there were in fact separate public schools for colored pupils in 
this case, the court found that the black children had been classified rather than 
excluded: 
Equality of rights does not involve the necessity of educating white and 
colored persons in the same school, any more than it does that of 
educating children of both sexes in the same school, or that different 
grades of scholars must be kept in the same school.  Any classification 
which preserves substantially equal school advantages is not prohibited by 
either the State or federal constitution, nor would it contravene the 
provisions of either.109 
The U.S. Supreme Court would cite Garnes in two of its major segregation cases, 
but the Court seems not to have read the opinion very carefully.  The first citation 
                                                                
10221 Ohio St. 198 (1872). 
103Id. at 203. 
104Id. at 207.  Because of the absence of any provision for the education of colored 
children in Van Camp, the Garnes court explicitly declined to “approve or disapprove” the 
result in that earlier case, although it did endorse the basic principle that the separate-school 
law was one of classification only.  Id. at 208. 
105Id. at 208. 
10683 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
107Garnes, 21 Ohio St. at 210. 
108Id. 
109Id. at 211. 
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came in Plessy v. Ferguson,110 as the first case in a list of state cases that upheld 
segregated schools.111  The second was second in another string citation in Gong Lum 
v. Rice,112 a case that suggested that the validity of segregated schools had long ago 
been settled.113  Plessy in particular might have been marginally less offensive had 
the majority relied on the Ohio Supreme Court’s approach in Garnes, with its 
emphasis on classification rather than exclusion.  Instead, the majority drew a forced 
distinction between political and social equality,114 then dismissed the idea that 
segregation stigmatized African Americans as a figment of hypersensitive black 
imaginations.115  Despite the result upholding segregation, Garnes at least did not 
add gratuitous insult to the injury of its actual holding. 
There is one last footnote to Ohio’s school segregation saga during the 
Nineteenth Century.  As in Roberts, which was effectively overruled by the 
Massachusetts legislature,116 the Ohio General Assembly repealed the statutory 
authorization for segregated schools in 1887.117  The repeal came about due to 
intense competition between Republicans and Democrats for the African American 
vote.118  The Ohio Supreme Court recognized the statutory repeal the following year 
in a one-paragraph opinion that made clear that boards of education could not take 
account of race or color in assigning children to public schools.119 
III.  THE END OF OHIO EQUALITY DOCTRINE AND THE MEANING OF THE  
STATE BILL OF RIGHTS 
The Ohio Supreme Court’s Nineteenth Century jurisprudence of racial equality 
reflected the country’s and the state’s profound ambivalence about this subject.  The 
                                                                
110163 U.S. 537, 545 (1896). 
111This string citation followed the Court’s discussion of the Roberts case involving 
segregation in Boston.  See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
112275 U.S. 78, 86 (1927). 
113Id. at 85-86.  See also Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 504 (1878) (Clifford, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (citing Garnes for the proposition that segregation is constitutional when 
there is “no substantial inequality” between separate accommodations). 
114Plessy, 163 U.S. at 545. 
115Id. at 551 (“We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in 
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a 
badge of inferiority.  If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but only 
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”). 
116See Ch. 256, 1855 Mass. Acts 674. 
117See An Act to Repeal Sections 4008, 6987 and 6988 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, 84 
Ohio Laws 34 (1887). 
118See GERBER, supra note 14, at 237-43. 
119See Bd. of Educ. v. State ex rel. Gibson, 45 Ohio St. 555, 16 N.E. 373 (1888) (per 
curiam).  The repeal of the segregation laws did not eliminate segregated schools in Ohio.  
See, e.g., Reed v. Rhodes, 500 F. Supp. 404, 407-10 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff’d, 662 F.2d 1219 
(6th Cir. 1981); Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 234-36 (S.D. Ohio 
1977), aff’d in part and remanded on other grounds, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), aff’d, 443 
U.S. 449 (1979). 
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court never invalidated a racial classification during this period.  In part, this 
reflected the arguments of litigants, few of whom ever contested the constitutionality 
of laws and public policies that discriminated on the basis of race.  The paucity of 
constitutional arguments might have reflected gaps in existing legal doctrine.  After 
all, the racial restriction on voting was written into the state constitution, and the 
federal Bill of Rights did not apply to the states at this time.120  When constitutional 
arguments were presented, the court either avoided or rejected them.  Even in 
rejecting such arguments in Garnes, the court at least treated them with a modicum 
of respect.  Of course, that ruling ignored the real meaning of segregation, which the 
first Justice Harlan recognized in his celebrated Plessy dissent: “Every one knows 
that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white 
persons from [facilities] occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from 
[facilities] occupied by or assigned to white persons.”121  Still, the Ohio Supreme 
Court apparently went out of its way to construe racial restrictions narrowly and 
repeatedly emphasized their evil effects.  In this respect, at least, the court was 
notably more sensitive than the U.S. Supreme Court and most other state courts. 
Unfortunately, the last school case was decided just a few years before the court 
effectively abandoned the idea of developing a coherent body of Ohio-based equality 
doctrine.  By 1895, the state supreme court was saying that the guarantees of the 
Ohio equal protection clause were coextensive with those of the federal equal 
protection clause.122  For more than a century now, the state constitution’s equality 
guarantee has had no independent significance.123  The only rationalization for this 
phenomenon was offered more than eighty years ago: the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
greater expertise arising from its dealing with more equal protection cases than “any 
state court.”124  One possible consequence of the retreat from Buckeye equality 
doctrine was a 1933 ruling upholding segregation in higher education.  In State ex 
rel. Weaver v. Board of Trustees,125 the court found no equal protection problem in 
                                                                
120See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
121Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Of course, 
Justice Harlan had his own blind spots about race.  See id. at 561 (discussing the Chinese, “a 
race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens 
of the United States”); see generally Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the 
Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151, 157-66 (1996). 
122See State ex rel. Schwartz v. Ferris, 53 Ohio St. 314, 341, 41 N.E. 579, 584 (1895). 
123See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 95 Ohio St. 3d 264, 266, 767 N.E.2d 251, 255 (2002); 
Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dep’t, 70 Ohio St. 3d 351, 353, 639 N.E.2d 31, 33 (1994); 
Beatty v. Akron City Hospital, 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 491, 424 N.E.2d 586, 591-92 (1981); 
Kinney v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 41 Ohio St. 2d 120, 123, 322 N.E.2d 880, 882 
(1975); State ex rel. Struble v. Davis, 132 Ohio St. 555, 560, 9 N.E.2d 684, 687 (1937); City 
of Xenia v. Schmidt, 101 Ohio St. 437, 449, 130 N.E. 24, 27 (1920); Steele, Hopkins & 
Meredith Co. v. Miller, 92 Ohio St. 115, 126, 110 N.E. 648, 651 (1915). 
124City of Xenia v. Schmidt, 101 Ohio St. 437, 449, 130 N.E. 24, 27 (1920).  This notion 
overlooks the possibility that the Ohio equality provision, like other state constitutional 
equality guarantees, was “drafted differently, adopted at different times, and aimed at different 
evils” than the federal provision. Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State 
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1197 (1985). 
125126 Ohio St. 290, 185 N.E. 196 (1933) (per curiam). 
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Ohio State University’s exclusion of an African American home economics major 
from living in a laboratory house with several other students, which was a degree 
requirement in her field.  The university offered her an alternative arrangement that 
would keep her from sharing quarters with white students.126  A per curiam opinion 
quickly dispatched her constitutional challenge.  To be sure, the opinion invoked 
Garnes for the proposition that she would have “substantially equal school 
advantages” under the alternative, segregated arrangement.127  The bulk of the 
analysis relied primarily on Plessy, however, as the justices went on to characterize 
the young woman’s claim as involving social rather than political equality and 
concluded that she had no legitimate grievance against the university.128  Although 
this ruling came only six years after the U.S. Supreme Court had suggested that the 
constitutional validity of educational segregation was settled,129 another state court 
would shortly find that some types of school segregation could still be 
impermissible.130  Moreover, the idea of segregating African American students 
within an otherwise racially mixed university seemed especially incongruous.131  
Whether or not greater reliance on Ohio constitutional doctrine would have changed 
the outcome of Weaver, the increased sensitivity to racial issues exhibited in so many 
of the Nineteenth Century opinions might have affected the tone of the ruling. 
Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court’s subordination of state to federal equality 
principles was part of a much more general reluctance to develop a body of doctrine 
interpreting other provisions of the state’s Bill of Rights.  This reluctance could not 
initially have reflected deference to the U.S. Supreme Court’s greater experience in 
dealing with individual rights claims asserted against state and local governments, 
because until 1925 no provision of the federal Bill of Rights had been incorporated 
against the states.132  In fact, the call for state supreme courts to develop an 
independent jurisprudence affording greater protection to individual liberties than 
was available under the U.S. Constitution dates back just over a quarter-century and 
arose in response to concerns about restrictive interpretations of the federal Bill of 
Rights.133  The Buckeye State was hardly a pioneer in this respect: the Ohio Supreme 
                                                                
126Id. at 290-94, 185 N.E. at 196-97. 
127Id. at 297, 185 N.E. at 199. 
128Id. at 297-99, 185 N.E. at 199.  This case became an issue in the 1936 gubernatorial 
election, when Democratic Governor Martin L. Davey attacked his Republican opponent, 
Attorney General John W. Bricker, for having defended the university in Weaver. See Frank P. 
Vazzano, Martin Davey, John Bricker, and the Ohio Election of 1936, 104 OHIO HIST. 5, 18 
(1995). 
129See supra text accompanying notes 112-13. 
130See Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 (Md. 1936). 
131See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
132See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes we may and 
do assume that freedom of speech and of the press–which are protected by the First 
Amendment from abridgment by Congress–are among the fundamental personal rights and 
‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment 
by the States.”). 
133See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); see also James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State 
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Court waited until 1993 to declare that “the Ohio Constitution is a document of 
independent force.”134  Indeed, the court’s hesitancy in this regard has been described 
as a judicial “failure.”135  Regardless of the accuracy of this description, the record is 
decidedly mixed.  Others in this symposium will address this topic in more detail.136 
For now, let me offer only two examples. 
Consider first the judicial minuet in the Robinette case, which involved the 
constitutionality of a motor vehicle search after a traffic stop.  The Ohio Supreme 
Court first held the search unlawful under the Fourth Amendment and the Ohio 
Constitution.137  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Amendment holding 
and remanded the case for further proceedings.138  Despite a virtual invitation from 
Justice Ginsburg in a concurring opinion to ground its decision exclusively on state 
law,139 the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the protections afforded by the state 
constitution were “coextensive” with those provided by the Fourth Amendment.140 
Finally, consider State ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State,141 a 4-3 regulatory-taking case 
decided late last year. The Division of Reclamation of the Ohio Department of 
Natural Resources designated 833 acres of land as unsuitable for coal mining 
because mining operations could harm an aquifer that supplied water to a nearby 
                                                          
Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 762-63 nn.5-7 (1992) (collecting additional sources 
advocating the same approach). 
134Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 67 Ohio St. 3d 35, 42, 616 N.E.2d 163, 169 (1993). 
135See Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism and the Ohio 
Supreme Court: Anatomy of a Failure, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 143 (1984). 
136See Bettman, supra note 10; Saphire, supra note 10. 
137State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 653 N.E.2d 695 (1995). 
138Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996). 
139See id. at 44-45 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (“On remand, the Ohio 
Supreme Court may choose to clarify that its instructions to law enforcement officers in Ohio 
find adequate and independent support in state law, and that in issuing these instructions, the 
court endeavored to state dispositively only the law applicable in Ohio.”). 
140State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St. 3d 234, 238, 685 N.E.2d 762, 766 (1997). The majority 
opinion emphasized that Article I, § 14 of the Ohio Constitution was “in almost the exact 
language” of the Fourth Amendment, id. at 239, 685 N.E.2d at 767, and that there was “no 
persuasive reason” to interpret the provisions differently. Id. at 238, 685 N.E.2d at 766. 
Applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court for 
Fourth Amendment purposes rather than the bright-line rule it had used in its previous 
decision, the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed that the search was unlawful. Id. at 246, 685 
N.E.2d at 771-72.  Because this ruling rested explicitly on the Ohio Constitution (albeit 
applying the same standard that applied under the Fourth Amendment), there were no grounds 
for seeking further review in the U.S. Supreme Court.  For discussion of the substantive 
implications of this final ruling in Robinette, see Christo Lassiter, Eliminating Consent from 
the Lexicon of Traffic Stop Interrogations, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 27 (1998).  For discussion of 
the judicial-federalism aspects of the case, see Marianna Brown Bettman, Identical 
Constitutional Language: What Is a State Court to Do? The Ohio Case of State v. Robinette, 
32 AKRON L. REV. 657 (1999); Ben Glassman, Decide the Law Clearly–A Reply to Judge 
Bettman, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 469 (2000). 
14198 Ohio St. 3d 1, 780 N.E.2d 998 (2002). 
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village.142  After concluding that the mining company had no federal takings claim,143 
the court declared that “states are free to interpret their constitutions independently 
of the United States Constitution as long as that interpretation affords, at a minimum, 
the same protection as its federal counterpart.”144  Because a 1907 Ohio case had 
recognized mineral rights as separate and distinct property interests under state 
law,145 the agency’s “unsuitable for mining” order had unconstitutionally taken the 
company’s mineral rights.146  That is the extent of the court’s analysis.147  Whatever 
else these cases might imply, they offer support for Professor Gardner’s skeptical 
view of judicial federalism: “State courts often seem downright reluctant to construe 
their state constitutions at all, and when they do so their opinions are often vague, 
perfunctory, or almost entirely dependent on analytic strategies and terminology 
borrowed from federal constitutional discourse.”148 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Race was a central issue in Ohio from the very beginning.  The original state 
constitution of 1802 and the successor constitution of 1851 explicitly limited 
suffrage to whites even as both documents forbade slavery.  Moreover, the 
legislature imposed various legal disabilities and restrictions on African Americans. 
For much of the Nineteenth Century, however, the Ohio Supreme Court tried to 
narrow the scope of those restrictions by developing a distinctive jurisprudence that 
was in some respects more progressive, and in general less obnoxious, than that 
developed in other states and by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Before the end of the 
century, though, the court gave up the quest for a distinctive approach to equality.  
The court’s diffidence in this area reflected a larger reluctance to develop an 
independent jurisprudence of individual liberty under the state constitution.  At the 
same time, the court never directly challenged the racist assumptions built into the 
state constitution.  For this reason, we should not delude ourselves into believing that 
the Ohio Supreme Court could have lit the way toward a more racially enlightened 
society.  Still, the failure to make better use of the state bill of rights was a lost 
opportunity. It remains to be seen whether the modern court can do better than its 
predecessors. 
                                                                
142Id. at 3-4, 780 N.E.2d at 1002. 
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